K-P's troubled triangle

At the same time, mineral extraction and shipments continue to flow out of North Waziristan, Mohmand and other areas of southern K-P.Although Regional Police Officer Bannu Ghafar Afridi withdrew disciplinary proceedings, including suspensions, show-cause notices and transfers of several Lakki Marwat police officials, in an effort to defuse unrest within his department, this was only the latest in a series of triggers involving police from the three districts.

On the face of it, the protests are localised, but beneath them lies a much deeper crisis: deficient inter-institutional trust, uncertainty over operational authority and weaknesses in the counterterrorism architecture in southern K-P.Even a cursory glance at the geographical map explains the intensity of the challenge.

Lakki Marwat, Bannu and Tank constitute a strategic hinge, linking Punjab, settled K-P, ex-FATA and the porous routes stretching into Afghanistan.

Bannu provides the critical northern gateway towards North Waziristan; Tank and DI Khan connect the southern approaches towards South Waziristan; and Lakki Marwat forms the central spine between Bannu and DI Khan, with direct, high-volume road access to Mianwali and the heartland of Punjab. The geography of this transit triangle makes it particularly vulnerable.

The infrastructure designed for commercial connectivity - carrying commuters, goods and livestock - can simultaneously serve as a conduit for militant groups, drug and arms trafficking, and other illicit trade.

Consider the Lakki-Darra Tang section of the Bannu-Mianwali road: a vital inter-provincial corridor where law-enforcement officials have repeatedly identified militant hideouts concealed in dense woodland along the boundary between K-P and Punjab.

While North and South Waziristan directly absorb cross-border shockwaves from Afghanistan, and the four northern districts (Upper and Lower Chitral and Upper and Lower Dir) face the challenges of rugged frontier infiltration, the Lakki-Tank-Bannu triangle functions as a primary transit and interception zone. It bridges the frontier with Pakistan's settled urban centres.

Consequently, these corridors are critical to determining the extent to which security forces can contain or prevent militant movement. Compounding this difficult situation is discontent within the local police force. In the province alone, terrorism has cost the K-P police at least 800 lives between July 2022 and July 2026.

The K-P police's own six-month report recorded 122 casualties from January to June this year. Police officers in Lakki, Tank and Bannu - a region where nearly 60 per cent of terrorist activity was recorded during 2025 - have repeatedly found themselves in an untenable position.

Multiple high-profile attacks this year have further distinguished the area from other conflict-affected territories. Battle-hardened insurgent groups continue to conduct hit-and-run attacks despite hundreds of pre-emptive intelligence-based operations. The police, in particular, bear the brunt of this campaign because they operate with inadequate armour, limited tactical support and, at times, unclear or conflicting directives from federal and provincial authorities.

Top-down disciplinary action against locally entrenched police officials and their social networks only adds to this difficult situation. And herein lies a core dimension of the present unrest: politicisation appears to be clouding the counterterrorism campaign in K-P, leaving local police caught between the provincial government and federal civil-military security institutions.

This can produce inter-institutional mistrust, conflicting courses of action and inadequate coordination. Policy coordination and effective execution consequently risk becoming casualties of competing institutional and political preferences. In such a context, even routine rotation of special elite forces within the larger region can become contentious and trigger the kind of outcry now witnessed in Lakki and Bannu.

If Islamabad and Peshawar continue to treat the simmering troubles of Lakki, Tank and Bannu as isolated local administrative problems, they risk weakening the very gateways that protect the country's core. Securing the transit triangle is no longer simply a regional security priority; it is a basic requirement for maintaining effective state authority.

Counterterrorism requires non-political inter-institutional synchronisation and coordination of policy and action. Only through such coordination can the gaps between policy and operations be addressed. Inadequate coordination among provincial and federal institutions appears to be at the heart of the police discontent.

Rather than simply receiving directives, local police want to be consulted and taken on board in counterterrorism operations. Security forces need effective control of the transit hubs, but the absence of trust between local policemen fighting militants and national security institutions makes this a formidable task.

Key security stakeholders should distinguish between firefighting and lasting conflict management. The former cannot substitute for the latter. Competition for credit, politicisation and a blame game will not help the country deal with proxy terrorism.

Resolving the crisis of confidence at the public level and addressing police grievances at the institutional level require moving beyond temporary administrative fixes. A calibrated response to a proxy war requires re-establishing institutional integrity, restoring and respecting the police command structure, fortifying inter-provincial transit links and clearly defining operational command.

Apolitical policy synchronisation and coordinated action are essential for an effective counterterrorism strategy. This would hopefully also restore confidence among people in the conflict-hit regions.