Force, dialogue or both?

The closure of border crossings for almost a year is also rooted in the same rationale. Official messaging increasingly suggests that relations with Afghanistan have reached a "point of no return" because of Kabul's alleged failure to rein in violent groups operating from its territory.

However justified Pakistan's counterterrorism responses may be, they carry a costly consequence: deepening hostility with the rulers in Kabul, an endless cycle of mutual accusations and little prospect of an end to daily violence.

This exposes a structural flaw in the current policy: every military or militant action triggers reciprocal accusations, further erodes trust and narrows the space for cooperative solutions.

Historical evidence from Vietnam, Afghanistan (both for the US and the former Soviet Union), and Iraq (for the US and UK) suggests that military action can temporarily suppress violence and create space for other measures. Yet, durable outcomes depend heavily on political legitimacy, local ownership, economic opportunity and addressing underlying grievances.

Counterinsurgency doctrine emphasises "clear, hold and build", yet the "build" phase - governance, public services and a sustainable political settlement - has often proved the most difficult.

China's approach in its Muslim-majority Xinjiang region illustrates a different, highly integrated model combining strict security and law-enforcement measures, large-scale deradicalisation and vocational training programmes, as well as substantial economic investment, infrastructure development, poverty alleviation and improved public services.

Chinese official data and statements report an absence of major violent terrorist incidents for several years, often dating this trend to around 2017.

They also cite a substantial increase in the public's sense of security, from the high 80 per cent range a decade earlier to over 99 per cent in some surveys, alongside the elimination of extreme poverty, significant GDP growth and expanded access to education, healthcare and connectivity.

China, as the sovereign authority with a monopoly over the use of force, extensive control over the public narrative and considerable resources, implemented an integrated strategy involving coercion, ideological re-education and development. Unlike external interventions, this approach operated within a different political and institutional framework, without comparable democratic or legal constraints.

It enabled the rapid suppression of violence and produced measurable economic and security gains, although concerns over human rights, coercive practices and restrictions on civil liberties remain central to international assessments of the policy. Pakistan's own kinetic operations in Swat, Waziristan and Khyber, including Operation Zarb-e-Azb in 2014 and subsequent nationwide efforts such as Radd-ul-Fasaad, also achieved significant tactical successes.

Militants were dislodged from key strongholds, large numbers were killed, violence declined sharply for a period in the mid-to-late 2010s, and state authority was re-established in areas previously lost to militant groups. However, the "hold and build" approach has remained largely confined to the "hold" phase.

Reconstruction has been slow, improvements in public service delivery limited, and governance gaps persistent, particularly in the former tribal districts. Socioeconomic grievances, weak institutions and limited economic opportunities continue to provide fertile ground for militant recruitment, the survival of ideological networks and the regeneration of sanctuaries.

The Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021 has further complicated this landscape.

It is, therefore, hardly surprising that violence in Pakistan has resurged and that Islamabad has been unable to persuade the Afghan Taliban to meet its demands for decisive action against the TTP.The lesson from Pakistan's kinetic campaigns, both at home and across the border, is that force can create temporary security, disrupt militant networks and buy time.

But without sustained efforts to establish legitimate governance, deliver responsive public services, expand economic opportunities and ensure political inclusion, the underlying problems persist, recur or mutate into new forms. Force is often necessary, but it is rarely sufficient.

Sustainable solutions require addressing the material and political conditions that allow militancy to take root, while recognising that identity, ideology and external support networks complicate any purely technical fix based on governance and development. Outcomes depend heavily on local context, institutional capacity, political legitimacy and the willingness to move beyond narrowly defined kinetic measures of success.

Pakistan now faces a double whammy: an indigenous militancy rooted in local grievances, including human rights and governance concerns, alongside cross-border and proxy-linked terrorism. This complex challenge requires minimising the factors that fuel non-state agendas while countering external drivers of violence.

Counterterrorism demands a coordinated, indiscriminate and sustained whole-of-government approach that targets militant sanctuaries, strengthens local institutions and combines security operations with political engagement and development. A policy centred predominantly on military pressure and border restrictions risks adding further layers of animosity and discontent on both sides of the divide.

The real challenge for Islamabad and Kabul is to break this cycle through a combination of credible security guarantees, sustained dialogue, effective governance and a shared commitment to preventing their territories from being used for violence against each other.