Gul Plaza building kept in use despite its dangerous condition: judicial commission

The Gul Plaza management did not correct the known defects, it said. Civil Defence reports from 2024 and 2025 identified the absence of fire safety equipment, the presence of flammable materials, and deficiencies in exit routes.

The report said that there was an extremely unwise delay in reporting the fire to the fire brigade, and that the power cut further reduced the chances of escaping from the upper floors due to darkness. Despite the presence of a speaker system in the building, it was not used.

The regularised plan of Gul Plaza had 1,102 shops, but in reality there were 1,153 shops. The shops contained a large amount of flammable merchandise., contrary to the fire brigade's own response standards, there was a delay in the fire brigade's arrival, with effective firefighting beginning approximately 35 to 40 minutes later.

Water shortages and refills affected firefighting and rescue, with the fire brigade's lack of timely deployment of critical equipment reducing its chances of rescuing accessible people trapped in the building. The report said that despite claims of water reserves at fire stations, the lack of effective water supply at the initial stage is a major management issue.

No legal action was taken to address the deficiencies revealed in the 2024 and 2025 inspections of Civil Defence. Even after the courts became active in 2025, legal action was not pursued., the failure of civil defence is not ignorance of the threat, but a failure to act on a known threat.

The report said that the district administration did not conduct a joint audit of Gul Plaza despite the three-tier fire audit system established on the instructions of the High Court. The Deputy Commissioner, South Office, is institutionally responsible for not activating the available audit and monitoring system., the SBCA cannot escape responsibility by standing for inspection based on a complaint.

Under the Sindh Building Control Ordinance, it had the authority to take corrective action in a dangerous building. SBCA is responsible for Gul Plaza's incomplete records and lack of effective monitoring of fire safety. The report said that Rescue 1122 personnel arrived after the fire broke out, but even then there was still an effective chance of rescue.

Rescue was possible from 11:15 to 11:20 am and some victims were also visible. Access from the ramp was also possible until 11:30 am.

Rescue 1122 did not convert the available time into a large-scale rescue operation., under the law, inspections of electrical installations and equipment were to be conducted regularly. electrical inspector, no regular electrical inspection of Gul Plaza was conducted. The commission stated that responsibility is not limited to a single institution or a single government.

There were legal authorities, an audit system, building control, firefighting and emergency response institutions in place at various times, but this system as a whole did not function effectively.

The report said that people in Gul Plaza lost their lives not only because of the fire but also because of delays, darkness, blocked roads and obstructed windows., the loss of life was caused by a dysfunctional safety system, ineffective audits, scattered institutional responsibility, and untimely rescue opportunities.