Russia's Taliban gamble

But differences between Islamabad and Kabul over cross-border terrorism prevented participants from agreeing on a common position. Pakistan's special representative for Afghanistan, Ambassador Muhammad Sadiq, reiterated Islamabad's concerns about terrorist groups operating from Afghan territory, particularly the TTP.

Afghan acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi rejected the allegations and called for resolving outstanding issues through dialogue. What made the meeting more significant was Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's acknowledgement of the Taliban's efforts against Daesh and drug trafficking, and his call for greater engagement with Kabul.

Russia formally recognised the Taliban government in July 2025. Lavrov's latest remarks, therefore, do not represent a sudden policy reversal. They underline a growing divergence between Moscow's approach and Islamabad's expectations.

What explains Russia's approach? The obvious explanation is strategic. Moscow wants to preserve its influence in Afghanistan, prevent instability from spreading into Central Asia and contain the threat posed by Daesh.

It also wants to limit the prospect of renewed Western military influence in the region. Yet some in Pakistan suspect that historical grievances may also have a role to play. Moscow has not forgotten the Soviet Union's defeat in Afghanistan during the 1980s, when Pakistan played a central role in supporting the Afghan resistance with American and Saudi assistance.

Some believe that Russia's growing relationship with the Taliban could partly reflect a desire to counter Pakistan's historical influence in Afghanistan. Another theory links Russia's approach to Pakistan's changing international alignments. Islamabad has developed closer ties with the Trump administration, while its Makkah Joint Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye has added another dimension to its strategic relationships.

Some observers speculate that Moscow may view these developments with suspicion, particularly if it believes Pakistan is moving closer to Washington or becoming part of a regional security arrangement that could affect Russian interests. Recent military contacts have added to the questions.

A Taliban military delegation participated in exercises in Russia and visited an exhibition showcasing military equipment and technology shortly before the Moscow Format meeting. These contacts indicate expanding engagement, although they do not establish that Moscow has decided to supply weapons to the Taliban.

For Pakistan, the concern is straightforward: closer regional engagement with Kabul could reduce pressure on the Taliban to act against the TTP. Islamabad argues that dialogue must produce verifiable action against groups launching attacks inside Pakistan.

Russia, meanwhile, appears convinced that maintaining relations with the Taliban offers a practical way to protect its interests. Moscow has little reason to abandon its broader relationship with Pakistan simply because the two countries differ over Afghanistan.

But the absence of a joint statement in Moscow exposed the limits of regional cooperation. Countries that share concerns about Afghanistan are increasingly divided over how to deal with its rulers. Ultimately, Russia's gamble rests on whether the Taliban can be relied upon to deliver what they promise.

Pakistan's experience shows that the Taliban cannot be trusted and have a tendency to betray their benefactors.